This paper presents a profile of the non-executive directors of Australia's largest public companies. Using descriptive data, it assesses the extent to which these companies adhere to the requirements set down in the Australian Stock Exchange's 'Principles of Good Corporate Governance'. In particular, board structure and composition is evaluated, and levels of remuneration and independence among non-executive directors are assessed. The paper concludes with a discussion of perceived versus actual independence of non-executive directors and the benefits of having non-executive directors present on company boards.
Introduction
In the wake of high profile business collapses such as Enron, WorldCom, HIH Insurance, and OneTel, and the increase in shareholder activism, public attention has become more focussed on corporate governance (Petra, 2005; Peaker, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005) . A common feature of these corporate scandals has been an inadequate system of corporate governance (O'Regan et al., 2005) . Defined as the "system by which companies are directed and controlled" (ASX, 2003, p. 3; Long et al., 2005, p. 667), corporate governance is concerned with, among other things, the "duties and responsibilities of a company's board of directors in managing the company" (Pass, 2004, p. 52) .
Conflicts of interest between company directors and executives have prompted both legislative and non-legislative reform aimed at safeguarding the interests of corporate stakeholders and strengthening the independence of company boards through the appointment of non-executive directors. Described as the "mainstay of good governance" (Editorial, 2003, p. 287) , non-executive directors are considered to add to the integrity and accountability of company boards. Although efforts to define the role of a non-executive director are said to have "taxed the nation's finest intellects" (Ham, 2002) , non-executive directors typically participate in long-term decision making, contribute external business expertise, identify potential business opportunities, and monitor the actions of company executives (Pass, 2004; Long et al., 2005; Higgs, 2003) .
Much of the academic literature concerning corporate governance and board composition in Australia and elsewhere has sought to establish causal relationships between board structure and firm performance or sought to apply a theoretical explanation for the behaviour of corporate boards. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) , for example, examined the top 348 companies in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), describing the board composition, examining the correlates of board composition, and attempting to link board demographics with corporate performance. Sharma (2004) studied the relationship between board independence and fraud across a sample of 62 Australian listed companies. He found that the presence of independent directors on company boards, and the absence of duality (board of director chairman not also being the CEO) significantly reduced the likelihood of fraud (Sharma, 2004 ). Brennan and McDermott (2004) assessed the extent of independence of boards of companies listed on the Irish stock exchange, profiling 80 company's boards and their adherence to the independence requirements set out in the Higgs Report. They found that only 48 (60 percent) of the companies examined had majority-independent boards. Brennan and McDermott (2004) noted that while directives such as the Higgs Report may be a move in the right direction, based on the results of their study they also stressed the limitations of using non-mandatory codes of conduct to achieve best practice.
Interestingly, Hooghiemstra and van Manen (2004) proposed an "independence paradox" concerning the role of non-executive directors. They conducted telephone interviews and mail questionnaires to survey the opinions of Dutch non-executive directors regarding their roles and limitations. They found that, although non-executive directors are expected to operate independently from management, in practice, they are unable to do so because they rely on this same group to provide them with the information necessary for decision making, thus leading to an independence paradox (Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004, p. 322) .
In an examination of the characteristics of non-executive directors in the UK, Pass (2004) conducted an empirical study of the 50 largest listed companies.
Gathering data on non-executive directors' characteristics such as age, gender, length of service, remuneration, and other directorships, Pass's (2004) study presented a comprehensive profile of non-executive directors within large UK companies and considered the consistency of this profile with the requirements and recommendations contained in legislative reforms. He found that while significant progress had been made in terms of meeting quantitative corporate governance requirements, such as majority independence recommendations, qualitative characteristics related to perceived independence and effectiveness continued to be questioned by commentators (Pass, 2004) .
Studies such as that conducted by Pass (2004) and Brennan and McDermott (2004) were first suggested by Pettigrew (1992, p. 178 ) who argued that:
…the study of boards and their directors has not been helped by overambitious attempts to link independent variables such as board composition to outcome variables such as board and firm performance. The task perhaps is a simpler one, to…provide some basic descriptive findings about boards and their directors.
Following the lead of Pass's (2004) study, and keeping in mind the comments of Pettigrew (1992) , this research provides a descriptive profile of the non-executive directors of Australia's largest public companies. In the next section, the Australian corporate governance framework is reviewed. This is followed by details of the sample of companies examined and a description of the characteristics of the nonexecutive directors of these companies. Finally conclusions are presented, along with research limitations and suggestions for future research.
Background: Corporate governance in Australia
Corporate governance policy reform in Australia has primarily been a response to both local and international corporate collapses, which were largely due to fraudulent behaviour and practices of key executives and inadequate corporate governance systems. Even though the Australian corporate failures "lacked the global impact of American failures like Enron and WorldCom" (Robins, 2006, p. 34 Corporate Governance in March (see Figure 1 ). These ten principles, and associated recommendations and guidelines, were intended to optimise "corporate performance and accountability in the interests of shareholders and the broader community" (ASX, 2003, p. 5) .
1 Recognising that not all companies have the same reporting and disclosure requirements, and, consistent with the recommendations of Justice Owen (HIH Final Report, 2003) , the ASX Principles were not made compulsory, however if a listed entity elected not to follow the recommendations, justification must be provided.
Take in Figure 1
As shown in Figure 1 , the second principle refers to the structure of the board of directors. It is recommended that boards of listed organisations have a majority of non-executive independent directors so that the board is able to appropriately discharge its responsibilities and duties. The purpose of non-executive director independence, both actual and perceived, is to provide key stakeholders such as shareholders and regulators with confidence that the director is sufficiently removed from the management of the organisation and "free of any business or other relationship that could materially interfere with the exercise of their unfettered and independent judgement" (ASX, 2003, p. 19) . Reiter and Rosenberg (2003, p. 1) supported this argument by explaining that the true independent director is one who "unconstrained by potential conflicts of interest will bring the sort of rigour and critical analysis required to limit recurrences of the debacles we have seen, and restore investor confidence". Leblanc and Gillies (2003) suggested that an effective board is composed of directors who are independent and competent and behave in manner that supports these characteristics. Competence has been measured by reference to such factors as years of experience, qualifications, and breadth of experience (O'Higgins, 2002; Pass, 2004 ). However ascertaining whether or not a director is truly independent is more subjective and it may be difficult to determine the level of independence of particular directors (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003) . The ASX recommendations enable a nonexecutive director to be classified as independent provided he or she is not a substantial shareholder of the company, has not been employed by the company in an executive capacity during the last three years, has not been a material professional advisor of the company during the last three years, and has no material contractual relationship with the company (ASX, 2003) . 2 However, while a director may meet the ASX definition of an independent director, social relationships, friendships and other forms of conflicts can compromise independence (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003) . Young (2003, p. 2) defines this ASX-type definition of independence as "resume independence".
To examine the profile of non-executive directors serving on the boards of Australian listed companies, the firms in the ASX 50 listing were selected. Details of the sample and the data gathered are provided in the following section.
Empirical tests

Sample selection
Companies in the ASX 50 at 30 June 2006 (i.e., the 50 largest stocks by market capitalisation in Australia) were chosen for analysis (ASX, 2006) . A list of these companies is presented in Appendix 1. The companies span nine industry sectors, as summarised in Table 1 .
Take in Table 1 As indicated in Table 1 , the majority of companies were from the Financial sector (38%), followed by Materials (20%), and Industrials (12% Pass (2004) , the following information gathered:
• Non-executive directors as a percentage of total board of directors
• Age of each of the non-executive directors, where available
• Gender of each of the non-executive directors
• Average time served by the non-executive directors on the company board
• Remuneration of each non-executive director
• Number of other non-executive directorships held
The results from this analysis are presented in the following section.
Results
Non-executive directors as a percentage of total
Across the ASX50 companies there were 350 non-executive directors from a total of 438 board members. Therefore, in total, approximately 80 percent of company board members were independent non-executive directors. The ASX requirement that the majority of board members be independent from management was met by all but one of the companies sampled. Publishing and Broadcasting
Limited (PBL), although it did list a majority of non-executive directors on its company board, did not meet the requirement that these non-executive directors also be independent. Of the twelve board members, four were executive directors, and eight were listed as non-executive directors. However, of these eight non-executive directors, only six were also independent from the company, meaning that only 50 percent of the company board was independent and that, therefore, the company was in breach of the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance. In its corporate governance statement within the 2006 annual report, PBL noted that it had not followed the recommendations of the Principles in all cases and its justification for the equal number of independent and non-independent directors was that it believed it was in the best interest of the company to structure the board in that manner (Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd, 2006) . Other companies with a low percentage of non-executive directors were Mirvac Group (63 percent) and Westfield (62 percent), however these boards still maintained a majority of non-executive directors as per the requirements of the Principles.
In comparison with the UK, it appears that Australian boards contain proportionally more non-executive directors. The majority of companies studied by Pass (2004) had non-executive directors comprising between 50 and 60 percent of the total board. It is also interesting to note the results of Kiel and Nicholson's (2003) examination of Australian corporate boards in 1996. Although their research involved a sample of 348 companies and is therefore not comparable to the current study, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) reported that the average proportion of non-executive directors on Australian company boards in 1996 was 69 percent.
Age and gender of non-executive directors
The age of non-executive directors on Australian company boards ranged from 32 to 74, with the average age being 60 years. This result is consistent with Pass (2004) who reported the average age of non-executive directors on the boards of the 50 largest UK companies to be 59 years. Interestingly, the average age of male nonexecutive directors (61 years) was somewhat higher than that of female non-executive directors (53 years).
There were fewer female non-executive directors compared to males, with just 17 percent of company boards including one or more female non-executive directors.
This compares to Pass' (2004) study which showed women represented 11 percent of the total number of non-executive directors examined. Both these and Pass's (2004) results appear to be an improvement on the situation described by Li and Wearing (2004) , who reported that only 6 percent of non-executive directors in the top 350 UK listed companies were female and suggested that women face a "second glass ceiling" even after reaching board level (Li & Wearing, 2004, p. 355 
Time served by non-executive directors
According to ASX Principle 2, to be considered independent from management, a director must "not have served on the board for a period which could or could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with the director's ability to act in the best interests of the company" (ASX, 2003, p. 20) . Therefore, it was important to collect data on the length of time served by non-executive directors on company boards. As shown in Table 2 , the length of service ranged from less than one year to 23 years, with the average time served by non-executive directors on a particular company board being 6 years. In some instances, for example Macquarie Airports and Macquarie Infrastructure Group, the corporate governance statement did not disclose the number of years a non-executive director had spent on the company board and these non-executive directors comprise the "not disclosed" column of Table   2 .
Take in Table 2
This result is consistent with Pass (2004) who found that the average length of service by non-executive directors was 5.6 years. However, the substantial length of time served by some non-executive directors may reasonably be perceived to interfere with the independence of these board members from the company and thus conflict with ASX Principle 2.
Remuneration of non-executive directors
The ASX Principles provide that non-executive directors may receive remuneration but that it must be disclosed clearly and adequately distinguished from the remuneration applied to company executives. In almost all cases this Principle was adhered to by the companies sampled. It is notable that the remuneration details provided by the Macquarie Infrastructure Group and Macquarie Airports were difficult to ascertain from the annual reports of these entities. Both these entities noted that they were not required to provide a remuneration report within their annual report but that they had done so in the interests of good corporate governance.
Despite this, the lack of clarity in the remuneration disclosures was significant. 
Other non-executive directorships
There has been global concern over the incidence of multiple directorships (Pass, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2006) . Although there may be some benefits of multiple directorships, such as bringing to company boards access to key resources, the Australian Shareholders Association has argued that any director who serves on more than five boards is not acting in the best interests of company shareholders (Kiel & Nicholson, 2006) . The non-executive directors examined in this sample held an average of three other directorships, with the largest number of other directorships held being 9 (see Table 3 ). Table 3 4 The median salary for company Chairmen was $416,751 and ranged between $26,793 and $1,147,000. The median salary for all other non-executive directors was $161,542 and ranged between $10,986 and $608,000. It should be noted that the lower salary range for both Chairmen and other nonexecutive directors was paid to newly elected Board members who had served less than one year on the company Board at the time the annual report was prepared. 
Take in
Summary and conclusion
This study has indicated that Australia's largest companies are adopting ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance. One of the key issues in Australian corporate governance reform has been the appointment of non-executive directors to company boards (ASX, 2003; Robins, 2006) . In this analysis of the 50 largest Australian companies, of the 438 board members reviewed, 350 or approximately 80 percent were non-executive directors. However, despite the appointment of nonexecutive directors to corporate boards, concerns as to the actual and perceived independence of these directors persist. While actual independence may be difficult to ascertain without being privy to the nuances of boardroom friendships, social relationships, and other forms of potential conflict, the perception of independence may also be significantly compromised by the levels of remuneration received by non-executive directors.
In the companies' sampled, the average level of remuneration of non-executive chairmen was $423,714 and, for non-executive directors, average remuneration was $139,458. The ASX Principles address this issue by simply stating that the level of remuneration must be "sufficient and reasonable" (ASX, 2003, p. 51) . The subjectivity of these terms inhibits their usefulness as a source of valuable guidance. A related issue was identified by Hooghiemstra and van Manen (2004) as the independence paradox which arises due to non-executive directors, in the course of fulfilling their responsibilities, relying heavily on the information provided by the same executives from whom they are to said to be independent.
A limitation of this study is a size bias resulting from only reviewing of or perhaps how or whether these two Principles overlap in decision making processes.
Future research could also incorporate theoretical perspectives such as network theory used by Murray (2001) to explain interlocking directorships across company boards.
It is argued that the presence of competent non-executive directors on the boards of companies is a significant benefit to the majority of stakeholders of organisations, particularly shareholders and regulators (Pass, 2004; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) . Non-executive directors can contribute significantly to organisations through setting organisational strategy, monitoring the performance of and reporting from executive management, and contributing to the development or removal of executive Promote timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters concerning the company.
Respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of those rights.
Establish a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control. 
Remunerate fairly and responsibly
Ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined.
Recognise and manage risk
Have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company's financial reporting. 
Promote ethical and responsible decision-making
Have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its responsibilities and duties. 
